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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
It has been claimed that cognitive therapists endorse sets of uplifting beliefs BECAUSE the client feels better believing them: not because 
they lead towards greater verisimilitude, a purported cognitivist‟s hallmark of rational choice. Since the therapist asks us to choose sets of 
beliefs that interpret evidence on the basis of grater individual happiness (all other things being equal), this suggests that the basis of 
choice goes beyond rationality.  I contend that the case against the rationality of cognitive therapy is not made if one allows a broadening 
of what to count as rational cognitive therapy. The rationality of therapy consist in how well it achieves its  goal. My claim is that at least 
one  goal is, or ought to be, greater information value of the client‟ dialogues. Among other things, information values encode affect.  
Understanding  reason in this way effectively  transforms our understanding of rationality in a way that may be incommensurable with the 
standard view. If incommensurable, there is no way to discover that we are still talking about the same thing. So, a challenge for this 
competing view is to say on what basis the term cognitive therapy may be projectable. I identify some constraints on this project and 
sketch a possible solution. 
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Waller (2001, 2002) makes the point that affect can be taken as evidence in support of a hypothesis to the effect that life sucks.  She then 
also takes note that cognitive therapy asks us to pick some particular theory among nondenumerbly  many equivalent theories that may 
support a body of evidence. And asks, “if many theories fit the evidence equally, on what basis do we call one preference more rational 
than another (Waller 2001 p. 31).”   She goes on to suggest that since the therapist asks us to pick one that interprets the evidence on the 
basis of greater individual happiness (all other things being equal) that this constitutes a basis that goes beyond rationality.  This does not 
mean that an irrational set of beliefs that adds up to greater happiness is to be preferred to rational beliefs: nor the converse. Such 
inferences would be allowed according to cognitive theory. Cognitivists just assume that rational consideration of evidence rarely supports 
the negative inference. The problem for Waller is of a different sort. Her worries are over choices among EQUALLY RATIONAL sets of 
beliefs where some sets of beliefs tend toward feeling as though life sucks and other sets of beliefs tend in a more upbeat direction.1  In 
such cases, Waller claims that therapists endorse the sets of uplifting beliefs BECAUSE the client feels better believing them: not because 
they lead towards greater verisimilitude (She takes greater truth to be the cognitivists‟ hallmark of rational choice). 2   
                                                          
 
1
.  Both sets of beliefs may have an equal ration of false vs. true beliefs, though not the same false beliefs. According to Waller, 
sometimes, therapists suggest that clients hold onto soothing beliefs irrespective of their truth. 
 
2.  There is another direction of critique of Waller‟s position I have not pursued. If she is right about affective responses counting 
as evidence towards beliefs, then it is perfectly rational to suppose  that there is warrant for an additional true belief that enters in here, so 
that the belief nets are not really underdetermined after all.  
 
If it really is true that T1 and T2 are other wise equal in Truth and T1 can add the truth  
 
(i.) “I‟m happy believing T1 but not T2" 
 
[The truth conditions for the first belief is the happenstance of certain affective responses being co-instantiated with a number of beliefs 
some true some not true. Whether or not I‟m aware of the coincidence is an independent issue (i.) Must remain true, if it is a truth, 
whether or not it enters one or the other belief nets.] 
  
Then there is a second order belief about the truth of this certain belief and it provides a reason for believing a number of other beliefs 
many of which we know will be false beliefs, which we might formulate as follow: 
 
(ii.) “ Just in case (i.) is true, it counts as a reason to choose T1: it does not count as a reason to choose T2" is true. 
 
(ii) says that it‟s true that I have a certain complex belief, a reason.  
 
[The truth conditions for this second belief do not contain the truth of (i.), but only confidence, or ability to suspend disbelief, in the truth 
of (i.) plus another group of beliefs about evidential support, logical relations, and so forth.] 
 
If we add the expression of (ii.) to T1 and T2  there is still an underdetermination since so far, we have not added more beliefs to one than 
to the other. Nor have I shown any of the other beliefs of T1 or T2 false. So, except that T1 or T2 my not cohere with (ii.), we are free to 
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Waller sees the problem as indicating a need for cognitive therapists to admit standards (e.g., normative, aesthetic, and emotional,) that lie 
outside of their standard views toward rationality and she suggests that verisimilitude be abandoned in favor of coherence.  While I 
endorse Waller‟s plea that therapists consider standards beyond rational decision making , I have contended that her case against the 
rationality of cognitive therapy is not made if one allows a broadening of what to count as rational cognitive therapy (Angelette 2002). 
Broadening the definitions of these terms allows us to consider an information theoretic interpretation of cognitive therapy and a means-
ends analysis that bypasses Waller‟s concerns with underdetermination and affect.  
 
The methods of rational decidability I offer follow from  considering cognitive therapy to consist in changes of information value of 
dialogues . On the analysis I advocate, counselors do not abandon the effort to find rational belief choice when the client is unable to find 
salient differences between their clients‟ individually held beliefs nets to which they have access. Counselors are further constrained to 
help clients compare the relative value of beliefs among conversants.  
 
The rationality of therapy consist in how well it achieves its  goal. My claim is that at least one  goal is, or ought to be, greater information 
value of the client‟ dialogues.  Since the goal of counseling is not greater individual well being of the client, the motivation to recommend 
irrational-soothing beliefs over rational-but potentially disturbing ones dissolves.  In fact, I do not recommend that counselors recommend 
a choice at all. I propose that they try to increase the clients ability to see beyond themselves to a greater horizon. 
 
Waller‟s conclusion could only follow if, in the absence of rational decidablilty between belief systems, our ONLY choice was to be 
based upon the goal of having happier clients. But, life-affirming goals of therapy need not be determined singularly on the basis of client 
affect.  I offered an alternative goal, change in the information value of dialogues. So, in those cases where rational decidability does not 
fail, there was not a problem and in case rational decidability does fail, she is obliged to tell us why the therapist should choose a course of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
choose T1 beliefs and be happy or T2 beliefs and not be happy. Unless affective response impugns  some other beliefs, or is of itself a 
“belief multiplier”  we can take it or leave it.  We must remember that the two sets of beliefs are on an equal footing in all other respects.   
 
But the complement of (ii.) 
 
(iii.) “It is not that case that „ the truth of (i.) counts as a reason to choose T1: it does not count as a reason to choose T2'” is true. 
 
causes problems. 
 
Supposing we can overcome the various scope ambiguities here, (iii.) says something like 
 (iv.) I don‟t have the belief (i.) and/or if I did, it wouldn‟t be a reason for choosing T1 
 
(iv.)  will not be believed in equally from the perspective of each belief net. Someone in the position of T1 may have evidence of the truth 
of (i.) and  know that it is true.  Yet, (iv.) says that they would deny belief in what they knew to be true. This means that we can add the 
additional belief in the complement of (ii.) to T2 but not T1. The addition of this further belief to one and not the other (if it is a false 
belief)  means the belief nets were not equal, though they seemed so. Underdetermination, in this instance  would then be defeated.  
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action on the basis she proposes instead of the alternative  basis I‟ve offered. 
 
Threats to Decidability at the Next Level 
 
I‟ve proposed that there is no easy answer to this question I‟ve posed for Waller (i.e. Why prefer the „happy client‟ basis over the 
„increased information‟ basis?)  because of the possibility that Waller‟s view of cognitive therapy and my own may be incommensurable. 
It is possible that we may become unaware of how the ontology implied by each approach to counseling undergoes a change as factors 
motivating choices among beliefs are interpreted from within each approach. The change is from an idiom where the targets of counseling 
are determined and defined [on my proposed alternative interpretation of cognitive therapy] in relation to terms in an event ontology 
(movement towards increased information goals) and abstract objects (dialogues), to an idiom where targets of counseling are determined 
and defined [on the traditional view] in relation to terms in an ontology of concrete objects (individual clients). It may be that this 
transformation limits the ability to fully communicate the current position in terms relevant to Waller‟s interests.3  
 
Can Waller Respond,  the Information of Dialogues View Isn‟t Cognitive? 
 
Waller has not challenged my results, and so it is left for me to do it for her.  One possible response to the information theoretic view of 
cognitive therapy is that I‟ve reinterpreted cognitive therapy beyond recognizability.  Is there anything left in my proposal that justifies  
still keeping the title cognitive therapy? 
 
I can try to sketch the beginnings of an answer to this further question in what remains of this presentation.  I want to begin with some 
ways in which the question might be interpreted. There are three main issues around which to formulate an answer to the hypothetical 
Wallerian response to my position: 1.) the relation of  affective response to cognition, 2.) the impact of underdetermination on 
decidability, and 3.)  what is to be said about clients with wacky beliefs.  
 
The relation of affective response to cognition 
Waller may want to object to my claims by asserting that cognitive therapy has certain features that can be gleaned from the literature 
written by it‟s founding experts such as Ellis or Beck, and that the concept of therapy I‟ve used  is not anything similar.  So, there is 
available the move that says, what ever I may have proposed for “philosophical counseling” simply doesn‟t apply to the standard 
cognitive therapy‟ a-rational prejudice towards clients‟ improved affect.  The objection continues, I‟ve done a bit of bait and switch. It‟s 
                                                          
 
3
.  It may be possible to see that views are incommensurable from a meta-perspective and yet the views retain their 
incommensurable character when viewed within competing perspective.  I may be able to determine that the Echer print is somehow odd, 
but if I am a character in the print the oddity may be inscrutable. 
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as though I‟d offered to sell a finely tuned Jaguar, but when you get the thing delivered you find that It‟s really a sail boat. Well it might 
be a really nice sail boat, but you were originally looking at cars.    
 
This move may not be available to Waller if she is serious about her coherentist orientation, for the bait and switch objection suggests an 
essentialist attitude towards the concept of cognitive therapy.4   Now, I‟d like to leave the issue of esssentialism aside but, it turns out that 
I cannot completely ignore it, for the trouble goes all the way down.  Unfortunately, there is not a lot I can do here in the compass of a 
brief presentation. But, we‟ll have to give it a try anyway.5.  
 
 What is wanted is a principled and independent 6  way of deciding between, 
 (1.) “This [pointing to (a.) a certain conglomerate of cognitists‟ theories, practices, and outcomes] is cognitive therapy, and, this [pointing 
to (b.) a different, but possibly 7  disjoint, set of theories practices and outcomes] is not cognitive therapy” is true.  
Vs. 
 (2.) “This [pointing to (a.) and (b.) as above] and nothing else is cognitive therapy” is true.  
On option (1.)  Wallererians prefer the traditional view when offered a choice between the traditional view of cognitive therapy and the an 
alternative such as I‟ve offered. On option (2.) they simply assimilate the new ideas into the older tradition. 
 
 If Waller is limited to a coherentist construal of the problem, she addresses this issue by deciding if (1.) or (2.) fits more closely with her 
higher level epistemological beliefs about rationality and cognition which includes a coherentist account of truth, not merely by consulting 
either history books or doing empirical tests.   
 
Now you might think there‟s nothing wrong with Waller consulting history books and texts written by experts for it often seems as though 
coherentism and historicism go hand in hand.  But if she does so, she will have bought herself a bushel of woes.  If she points to the 
history of uses of the term cognitive therapy in the hope of discovering what to count in sets (a.) or (b.), one may ask an assortment of 
questions, such as: “do those uses pick out their subject essentially?”, or “ Do they suggest principles of projectablility that rule out (2.) ?”   
If the former, she has some backpeddling to do to explain how such an essentialism can fit in with her coherentism.   If the later, can she 
show independence?   Can the principles, which she discerns, be wielded without reference to a conception of rational cognition that is not 
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.   I do not believe that, strictly speaking, coherentism and essentialism  must be held to be incompatible. But, It is not an easy 
line to take and I doubt that Waller would be tempted down that road. 
 
5. I‟ll start with a few assumptions that will certainly be in some need of considerable bolstering at some later date 
 
6. Independent here means that the grounds for picking (1.) or (2.) don‟t appeal to an understanding of rationality or cognition 
that is already contained in only one of the possible alternatives. 
 
7
.  It is either the case that the sets are disjunct or not. However, there is no a priori way to rule on this. 
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already founded in a preference that prejudices her ability to choose between (1.) and (2.)?   The trouble is that if she does so appeal, to 
her beliefs about rationality and cognition,  her argument will be circular, since it is that set of beliefs which grounds her coherentism in 
the first place.  But, then, that‟s the beauty of coherentism.   It gets to duck grounding worries as long as enough beliefs stick together for 
warranted assertability.  I‟m all for warranted assertability, but I‟d like some story about which beliefs are actually coherently hanging 
together here. 
 
For myself, I am not barred from taking an essentialist line because of a special affection for coherentism.  But if I go down that road, I 
too will have difficult problems to deal with. For an examination of the history of uses of the terms at issue will not include reference to 
the interpretation of rational cognition I‟ve championed.   
 
Rather than seeing this first issue to be addressed as the question of synonymy between  my interpretation of counseling and Wallers more 
narrow construal of rational cognitive therapy, I see it as the question of  grounds for the projectability for the terms rational cognition.  
 
Given the two competing interpretations of rational cognition, I propose that the information theoretic interpretation of cognition [as 
discovered in the analysis of dialogues] I put forward, has greater explanatory breath than does the standard view of cognitive therapy  
which focuses upon an individuals internal “self talk”.  Among the virtues of the dialogues alternative is that focus on dialogues solves 
Waller‟s worries generated by considering affective responses as evidence.  The principle of explanatory breath invoked does not 
prematurely buy into any particular interpretation of  cognition that would prejudice the choice between (1.) and (2.).8  
 
 
The Impact of Underdetermination and Incommensurability 
 
I acceptWallers point about underdetermination, The effect of underdetermination, as Waller acknowledges, is less severe for coherentists.  
Since, I can get by with merely a disquotational sense of truth,  my proposal floats as well on coherentist theory as it does on a 
correspondence theory.  Further, since the information theoretic response that incorporates affective response is not impacted by the point 
about underdetermination, it recommends itself more highly than does the more narrow view of traditional cognitive therapy. But, this is 
merely a practical recommendation made at the level of meta-science, not necessarily a realizable and rational option for the cognitive 
therapists at work in the trenches.  So, in a sense, I have changed the subject. 
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.    The principle is not neutral to any interpretation of rational. Specific features that make a choice rational may vary between 
(a.), (b), ~(a.), and ~(b.).  Only if, it could be shown that consideration of broader scope has the same evaluative weight across all 
interpretations of cognitive therapy would it prove neutral. 
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 I‟ve had to step out of the cognitive therapists perspective and introduce methodological values that could not have been arrived at 
through a consideration of the cognitive therapist‟ theory alone.  Perhaps,  I‟ve given an answer to the question, “Ought the theory of 
cognitive therapy assimilate the new proposal.”  The question remains, “Can the theory of cognitive therapy assimilate the new proposal.”  
Ordinarily we are inclined to accept easily that Ought implies Can. For surely it is outrageous to insist that one ought to do what could not 
possibly be done.  But, It‟s an additional step to go from  ought implies can to showing just how it is so. 
 
 Here the argument is more than just projectability vs synonymy.  Here there is a positive choice to be made by traditional cognitive 
therapists that is not answerable from within the perspective of the cognitive therapist‟ tradition. It will take a certain leap of faith. For, if  
I‟ve been right to suggest that there may be an incommensurability between construing cognitive therapy in a traditional way and 
understanding it as assessment of dialogues, cognitive therapists will be barred from  rational comparison of the competing views. Since, 
it is a corollary of the incommensurability thesis that it creates a cognitive crisis which effectively rules out rational comparison.9  
 
So, let us step forward and see what sort of religion our leap leads us toward.  There are already available within cognitive theory a 
number of paths that hint in a direction which may prove friendly to the information theoretic construal of cognitive therapy. We can start  
to see down this path by asking the question: Can a general - dimensional account of valuation, embodied in affect, be integrated into an 
account of rational decision making?    
 
By a dimensional account of cognitive therapy I mean accounts of therapy that incorporate a hypothesis to the effect  that differences in 
behaviourial output [which we term variously in our folk psychology as moods, impressions, interpretations, etc ] are, when viewed from 
the perspective of neuro-psychology, best understood as described in a function implemented over time at various degrees or levels of 
activation through out a neural net.    
 
By a general account I mean accounts of cognitive therapy which accept the proposition that valuation is a singular type of cognitive 
process with many guises. Such accounts might hypothesize that the neuro-biological underpinnings of valuation events are [or more 
weakly, are best modeled as] some single set of functions implemented throughout our neural nets.  If some such account is accepted it 
might have the potential to provide the basis for mapping and tracking the information exchanges of dialogues.  
 
By contrast,  non-general accounts of cognitive therapy focus on differences between moral valuation, economic valuations, aesthetic 
valuation, etc.  While such non-general accounts often provide us with valuable insights, they often carve up the domain of discourse in as 
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.  The debate about the rational comparability of incommensurables goes on see, Heunegan-Huene and Sankey 2002 for recent 
reflection.  
  
9 
many unproductive as productive ways. 10    Non-dimensional accounts focus on discrete categories such as good, bad, true, false, 
functional, dysfunctional, etc.,  and produce hierarchical classification, e.g. DSM-IV-TR.  The information theoretic account, aware that 
hierarchical classification presents the threat of incommensurability (Kuhn 1991, 1991b, Sankey 1997),  prefers dimensional models 
because they provide methods for dealing with fuzzy boundaries not available to categorical models.  
  
 
A Peek at Meta-Philosophy and Normative Naturalism 
 
As for nutty clients, I‟m afraid I have little to offer at present.   I‟ll leave that for another time.  I want, instead, to take a look back over 
the territory we‟ve traversed so that I can ask still another question, a question about the value of the path itself.  Are we trying to 
understand rationality and value, or has the enterprise warped ,unnoticed, into some other  zone?  I think it has. Beneath all these recent 
efforts to re-invent rationality in a way that accommodates emotion, I detect a current -   a current I hope shared by us all which partly 
defines us as philosophers, perhaps even as persons.  Since, we have been wrestling with integrating emotions into value and rationality, I 
can say undefensively that I have a peculiar emotion, a kind of longing characteristic of philosophers, small children ,and the dying. This 
peculiar longing has not, to my knowledge, been given a name except in the context of meta-philosophy as philosophical longing.  
Sometimes we want the longing to stop. Other times we want to savor the longing.  For sometimes, it is a hopeful  longing or it creates 
excitement in other ways.  But always it is ahead of us - the object never quite reached. This is ,of course, familiar ground eloquently 
covered by other philosophers. It‟s part of the story we tell to our philosophy 101 students who wonder what we are going on about.  But 
in the context of this presentation  we can look at the project of containing emotion in an information theoretic approach to cognitive 
therapy and ask ourselves, why.  How is it we are tempted to think this might be a good way to effect this containment?  Why pursue this 
path rather than some other. What inclines us to even try?  One answer is that It‟s the sort of program of research that would fit in with a 
normative naturalist approach.  What  peaks our interest in attempting to do it this  way? What gives it the feel of a comforting possibility?   
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. In Boundary (forthcomming, Deaking University) I argue that certain attempts to distinguish therapy from ethics are 
incoherent. 
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